Witter v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 73444 (Nov. 14, 2019) by Bays, John
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law 
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals 
Fall 11-2019 
Witter v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 73444 (Nov. 14, 2019) 
John Bays 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bays, John, "Witter v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 73444 (Nov. 14, 2019)" (2019). Nevada Supreme Court 
Summaries. 1273. 
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1273 
This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository 
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please 
contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu. 
Witter v. State, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 73444 (Nov. 14, 2019)1 
 




 The Court determined that (1) a judgment of conviction containing a restitution provision 
must contain the specific amount of restitution required; (2) a judgment of conviction containing 
an indeterminate restitution provision is not a final judgement for purposes of appeal or for 
purposes of triggering the deadline for filing a habeas petition; and (3) the principle of finality 
requires that even when such an error is made, if the defendant treats the judgment as final by 
litigating, the defendant is estopped from later arguing that judgment was not final and that 




 In 1995, William Witter was tried before a jury and found guilty of first-degree murder as 
well as several other charges. The District Court entered a judgment of conviction and shortly after 
amended the judgment, adding a provision requiring Witter to pay restitution “in the amount of 
$2,790.00, with an additional amount to be determined.” Witter filed a direct appeal, and the 
conviction was affirmed by the Nevada Supreme Court in 1996. Witter then brought several 
postconviction petitions for writs of habeas corpus and also sought relief in federal court. Witter 
never challenged the indeterminate restitution provision or finality of the conviction in any of these 
proceedings. In 2017, Witter filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus specifically 
arguing that his conviction was not final because the 1995 conviction contained an indeterminate 
restitution provision. The District Court denied the petition and amended the 1995 judgment to 




 Witter argued that because the 1995 judgment contained an indeterminate restitution 
provision, his conviction was not final until the third amended judgment deleting the provision in 
2017. Witter further argued that this made the 1996 direct appeal and all subsequent proceedings 
null and void for lack of jurisdiction, allowing him to presently raise issues originating in the initial 
1995 trial without regard to the “law of the case.” The State argued that the Court lacked 
jurisdiction over Witter’s current appeal and that the restitution provision was insignificant.  
 As an initial matter, the Court noted that Nevada statutory law requires that convictions 
containing restitution provisions must include the specific amount of restitution required.2 
Therefore, judgments that fail to comply with this requirement do not constitute final judgments.3 
The Court noted that its prior holding in Whitehead v. State established that convictions containing 
indeterminate restitution provisions were not final judgments for the purpose of starting the one-
year statutory period to file a postconviction habeas petition.4 The Court also highlighted its 
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previous ruling in Slaate v. State, wherein the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over an appeal 
from a judgment containing an indeterminate restitution amount on the grounds that the judgment 
was not final.5 The Court then rejected the State’s argument that indeterminate restitution 
provisions were insignificant and that the Court should follow federal court decisions on this 
matter. Although the Court recognized that federal courts did interpret federal statutes on the issue 
differently, the Court rejected the State’s argument on stare decisis grounds and refused to overturn 
its precedent. Furthermore, the Court rejected the contention that restitution specificity was 
insignificant under Nevada Statutory law.  
 However, although the Court affirmed its commitment to its prior precedent regarding the 
necessity of specificity in restitution provisions, it ultimately held that Witter’s case was 
distinguishable from prior precedent for two reasons. First, unlike Slaate, wherein the conviction 
resulted from a guilty plea, Witter’s conviction resulted from a jury verdict.6 This meant that, 
unlike the defendant in Slaate, Witter could appeal the judgment under the NRS 177.015(3) 
provision permitting a defendant to appeal from a “verdict”. Ultimately, since Witter could appeal 
from the verdict itself (and not just the final judgment like the defendant in Slaate), the finality of 
Witter’s conviction would not have affected the Court’s determination on jurisdiction.  
 However, the Court’s second and most important point in distinguishing Witter’s case 
Whitehead and Slaate was that Witter had treated the 1995 conviction as final and litigated the 
case extensively since. In both Whitehead and Slaate, the defendants raised the finality issue during 
their first appeals proceedings.7 In contrast, Witter had litigated a direct appeal and undertaken 
state and federal court proceedings regarding his conviction, all the while never challenging the 
indeterminate restitution provision. The Court noted that finality is a compelling concern in such 
delayed challenges, because significant delays burden both the parties and the courts with 
numerous practical difficulties.8 Ultimately, the Court therefore emphasized that under its 
longstanding precedent, a litigant cannot challenge the finality of a judgment or that the present 
court lacked jurisdiction in a prior appeal if the litigant has treated the initial judgment as final.9 
Therefore, since had Witter had treated his 1995 conviction as a final judgment until 2017, the 
Court declared that he was prohibited from arguing that his conviction was not final and that 
subsequent proceedings were null and void on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.  
 The Court briefly ended its discussion by rejecting the State’s arguments that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Witter’s appeal, since the issues arising from an amended conviction are 
appealable under Nevada statutory law.10 However, the Court did note that since Witter only raised 
issues arising from his initial trial in 1995, and not the 2017 amended judgment, Witter had failed 




 Ultimately, the Court’s decision emphasized that Nevada statutory law requires that any 
restitution provision in a judgment of conviction must be specific, rather than indeterminate. 
Furthermore, the Court affirmed its prior precedent and held that an indeterminate restitution 
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provision renders the judgment nonfinal. However, and crucially for Witter’s case, the Court 
emphasized that even in circumstances such as this where an indeterminate restitution provision 
error has been committed in the initial conviction, if the defendant has proceeded to treat the initial 
judgment as final and litigated the matter, then the defendant has lost their right to challenge the 
initial conviction’s finality on indeterminate grounds. Witter had certainly treated the 1995 
conviction as final, litigating the conviction for over twenty years before challenging the 
convictions finality on indeterminate grounds. Therefore, the Court ultimately held that concerns 
regarding finality outweighed concerns regarding the error of the indeterminate restitution 
provision and affirmed the 2017 amended judgment of the District Court.  
